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FE-h. H);)2 J BE~TOX I'. Sr.OSf; 
[38 C.2d 399; 240 P.2d 5751 
20 IJ.R.A.N.S. 337].) [6] In view of the circumstances, we 
('allnot say that the condition imposed here is unreasonabl('. 
Th(' ordcr to show cause is discharged, and the petition is 
u('nied. 
ShE-nk, J., Bdmonds, .T., Carter, J., Traynor, J.,Scbauer, .J .. 
and Spence, J., concurred. 
Petitionel"s applil'ation for a l'('hl'arillg" was denied )Ial'('h 
6, 1952. 
[L. A. Xo. 22125. In Bank. Feb. 15, 19:)2.] 
BEATRICE.J. BEXTOX, a minor, ete., et aI., Respondents, Y. 
L. D. SLOSS, Appellant. 
[1] Automobiles-Care as to Guests.-While Veb. Code, § 403, 
protects the driver and all persons legally liable for his 
conduct from liability to guests for ordinary negligence, he 
is liable for in.iuriE's to guests caused· by his intoxication 01' 
wilful misconduct. 
[2] Id.-Persons Liable-Owner-Wilful Misconduct of Driver.-
Owner of vehicle cannot be held liablE' under Veh. Code. 
§ 403, for wilful misconduct of 19-year-old boy in racing a 
defective car on the highway against another car, where thcrl' 
is no showing that the boy was the owner's agent. 
[3] Id.-Persons Liable-Owner-Wilful Misconduct of Driver.-
Owner of vehicle cannot be held liable for wilful misconduct 
of driver under Veh. Code, § 402, imputing to owner of YE'-
hicle liability for negligent operation, where there is no 
principal-agent relationship between owner and driver. 
[4] Id.-Persons Liable-Owner-Construction of Statute.-Phrase 
"person legally liable" in Veh. Code, § 403, barring action!' 
against the "drh'er" of a vehicle or against "any other person 
legally liable for the conduct of such driver" is intended to ': 
cO\"l'r cases in which the owner is vicariously liable for the 
driver's conduct because of the rl'lationship of the partil'!', 
[lJ Liability of owner or operator for injury to guest, note!;, 
20 A.L.R. 1014; 26 A.L.R. 1425; 40 A.L.R. 138; 47 A.L.R. 327; 51 
A.L.R. 581; 61 A.L.R. 1252; 65 A.L.R. 952. See, also, Cal.Jur., 
lO-Yr.Supp., Automobiles, § 358; Am.Jur., Automobiles, § 237. 
iriCK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles, § 123(1); [2,3J Auto-
mobiles, §167(1l); [4-6] Automobiles, §167(2); [7,8,11) Auto-
mobiles, § 63n; (9) Automobiles, § 220; [10,12J Automobiles, 
§ 167(8). 
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as principal-agent, or because of imputed negligence. under 
Veh. Code, § 402. 
[5] ld;-Persons Liable-Owner-Construction of Statute.-Veh. 
Code, § 403, does 1I0t limit the common-law liability of the 
owner' of a vehicle for his own negligence as owner. 
[6] ld.-Persons Liable-Owner-Construction of Statute.-Under 
Veh. Code, § 403, the only pel'Sons absolved from liability to 
guests for ordinary negligence are the driver and those legally 
responsible for his acts, and where the owner is not the 
driver the word "driver," as used in such code provision, 
will not be construed to include "owner" so as to absolve . 
him from liability for failure to maintain his vehicle in proper 
mechanical condition. 
[7] ld.-Sales and Transfers-Liability for Defects.-Although a 
used car dealer does not insure the safety of a car he sells ! 
and is under no duty to disassemble the car to examine its i 
parts, he must make a reasonable inspection for defects which 
would make the car a menace on the highways. 
[8] ld.-Sales and Transfers-Liability for Defects.-In action 
for injuries sustained by guests of minor while riding in 
automobile which' he intended to purchase from defendant 
used car dealer, it is reasonable to conclude that a reasonable 
inspection would have disclosed defective brakes in such car ' 
where, although defendant testified that he had given the 
car a road test about five days before the proposed sale and 
that the brakes had then operated satisfactorily, there is no 
evidence that he made any test to determine whether the 
brakes met the standards prescribed by Veh. Code, § 670, 
where his mechanics did not inspect or do any work on the 
brakes, and where the failure of the brakes shortly after 
delivery of the car to the minor indicates that the defect was 
present and discernible at the time of the proposed sale. 
[9] ld.-Evidence-Defective Brakes.-In action for injuries sus-
tained by guests of minor while riding in automobile which 
he intended to purchase from defendant used car dealer, it 
is reasonable to conclude that defendant's negligence in fail-
ing to make a reasonable inspection of the vehicle for defects 
was a contributing cause of plaintiffs' injuries, and that be-
cause of defective brakes the minor could not avoid colliding 
with a telephone pole when his car skidded across the highway, 
where the minor's testimony, corroborated by that of his 
guests and by. skid marks on the pavement, established that 
a rear wheel of the car locked when he attempted to apply 
the brakes, and one of the guests testified that the ear swung 
[7] Liability of seller of defective or unsafe automobile for 
injury or damage caused thereby, notes, 99 A.L.R. 240; 122 A.L.B. 
997. See, also, Am.Jur., Automobiles, § 349. 
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to the right when the minor applied the brakes, although he 
kept turning the steering wheel to the left. 
[10] ld.-Persons Liable-Used Car Dealer.-Negligent conduct 
of minor in driving automobile which he intended to purchase 
from a used car dealer does not relieve such dealer from 
liability for injuries resulting from his negligence in selling 
such automobile equipped with defective brakes, for the likeli-
hood of negligent operation of the vehicle is a hazard which 
the dealer can reasonably foresee. 
[11] ld.-Sales and Transfers-Liability for Defects.-Possibility 
of a driver's negligently placing himself in a position from 
which he cannot extricate himself without adequate brakes 
imposes on a used car dealer a duty to test and adjust the 
brakes of the car, and thus prevent it from endangering the 
lives of occupants, pedestrians and other users of the high-
way; and this duty extends not only to a prospective buyer, 
but also to third persons who can reasonably be expected to 
be in the vicinity of the possible use of the automobile. 
[12] ld.-Persons Liable-Used Car Dealer.-Where used car 
dealer gaye minor permission to take an automobile to his 
home to induce his father to sign a contract to purchase the 
car, such dealer could reasonably expect that the minor would 
not only test performance of the car, but also drive it pending 
negotiation of the contract; and where the father refused 
to sign the contract, the dealer did not as requested by the 
father CODle for the car, and the minor thereafter endeavored to 
return the car, but the dealer's used car lot was closed, it 
cannot be said that the minor's operation of the car on that 
day was a risk beyond that created when the dealer allowed 
him to take the car from the lot. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County. Arthur L. Mundo, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained in an 
automobile accident. Judgrqent for plaintiffs affirmed. 
McInnis & Hamilton and John W. McInnis for Appellant. 
Johnson & Johnson and Harry Ashfield for Respondents. 
Belli, Ashe & Pinney, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Re-
spondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On Friday, May 23, 1947, defendant Jay 
Fetters, a 19-year-old boy, selected at defendant Sloss' used 
car lot a 1935 Chevrolet that Sloss had purchased five days 
earlier. Sloss did not ask Jay his age or whether he had a 
) 
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driver's license. Jay paid $75 of the $100 down payment, 
and Sloss allowed him to take the car home. On Saturday 
afternoon, Jay returned with the car and the $25 balance of 
the down payment. While filling out the sales contract, Sloss 
discovered that Jay was a minor and refused to complete the 
contract unless Jay's father signed it. Jay left the lot about 
5 o'clock with the car and a contract form for his father to 
sign. The father refused to sign. He testified that "when I 
looked at the car and seen it was nothing but a wreck I called 
up Sloss and told him to come and get the car j that the kid 
had no business with it; that he had no driver's license and no 
experience, and that it was nothing but 8 wreck, but he 
wouldn't pick it up." The father then told Jay to return 
the car. Jay drove it to the lot Saturday night and again 
Sunday morning, but Sloss. was not there at either time. 
After leaving the car lot on Sunday morning, Jay met two 
minor girl friends, Beatrice Benton and Marlie Alden, plain-
tiffs in this action, and a boy friend (Richard Kasitz, and 
took them for a rid~ in the country. They were accpmpanied 
by another car driven by Elden Earnest. The two drivers 
were racing and alternately passing each other on a two-lane 
highway at about 45 miles per hour. As Jay was passing 
Elden's car, another car suddenly emerged from a dip in the 
road. To avoid a head-on collision, Jay swerved to the right, 
and passed in front of Elden's car and behind a car immedi-
ately ahead of Elden travelling in the same direction. Since 
the Chevrolet did not have a horn, Jay could not warn Elden 
to pull over or slow down. To avoid hitting the car in front 
of Elden, Jay applied his brakes. The right rear wheel 
locked and the left wheel brakes failed to operate. His car 
skidded across the highway, leaving black skid marks on the 
right side only. Jay attempted to drive onto the shoulder 
of the highway, but the car slid into a telephone pole by the 
highway. Plaintiffs were injured by the collision of the car 
with the telephone pole. 
Plaintiffs filed this action against Sloss, Jay, and Jay's 
father. The case was tried without a jury, and each plaintiff 
recovered judgment against Jay and Sloss. Judgment was 
returned in favor of Jay's father. Defendant Sloss alone 
has appealed. 
[1] Sloss first contends that he is absolved from liability 
under section 403 of the Vehicle Code.· This statute protects 
·"No person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle upon a 
hi~hway without givin~ compensation for such ride, nor any other 
Feb. 1952] BEXTOX V. SLOSS 
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the driver and all pel'SOIlS legally liable for his conduct from 
liability to guests for ordinary negligence. 'fhe driver is 
liable, however, for injuries to his guests caused by his intoxi-
cation or wilful misconduct. [2] There is no evidence of in-
toxication in the present case, but the trial court found that 
Jay was guiltr of wilful misconduct in operating a defective 
car, operating it without experience, and racing it on the 
highway against another car. Sloss, however, cannot be held i 
under section 403 for Jay's wilful misconduct, since there was 
no showing that Jay was Sloss' agent. (Stober v. Halsey, 
88 Cal.App.2d 660, 665 [199 P.2d 318).) [3] For the same 
reason Sloss cannot be held under Vehicle Code, section 402, 
imputing to the owner of a vehicle liability for negligent opera-
tion, for, in the absence of a principal-agent relationship be-
tween the owner and the driver, the owner is not liable for 
the driver's wilful misconduct. (Weber v. Pinyan, 9 Cal.2d 
226,238 [70 P.2d 183, 112 A.L.R. 407).) 
In the present case, however, plaintiffs seek to hold Sloss 
for his own negligence, and not as a person legally respon-
sible for the driver's acts under section 403, or as an owner 
under section 402. (See Weber v. Pinyan, supra, 9 Cal.2d 
226,237.) [4] Section 403 bars actions against the "driver" 
of a vehicle or against" any other person legally liable for the ! 
conduct of such driver." The phrase "person legally liable" 
for the driver's conduct is clearly intended to cover cases in 
which the owner is vicariously liable for the driver's conduct 
because of the relationship of the parties, as principal-agent, 
or because of imputed negligence under section 402. (Stober, 
v. Halsey, supra; Stephen v. Spaulding, 32 Cal.App.2d 326 
[89 P.2d 683].) [5] Section 403 does not limit the common-
law liability of the owner of a vehicle for his own negligence 
as owner. 
Sloss contends that since the owner of an automobile would 
be guilty of ordinary negligence in failing to make proper 
repairs, and would be protected by section 403 if he were 
driving the car at the time of the accident (Rhoads v. Studley, 
15 Cal.App.2d 726 [59 P.2d 1082] ; Ohlson v. Frazier, 2 Cal. 
App.2d 708 [39 P.2d 429]), the purpose of the section would 
person, has any right of action for civil damages against the driver 
of such vehicle or against any other person legally liable for the eon· 
duet of sueh driver on account of personal injury to or the death of 
sueh guest during such ride, unless the plaintiff in any such action 
establishes that sueh injury or death proximately resulted from the 
intoxication or wilful misconduet of said driver." 
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be defeated if hEl were held liable for the same act of negli-
gence merely because he was not driving at the time of the 
accident. 
[6] Section 403, however, nowhere refers to owners of 
vehicles. The only persons absolved from liability are the 
driver and those legally responsible for his acts. Sloss was 
not the driver and the action against him is not based on 
any responsibility he might have for the driver's conduct. 
Sloss would bring himself within the section by construing 
"driver" to include "owner," but the section does not admit 
of that construction. Moreover, plaintiffs were Jay's guests, 
not Sloss', and are in the same position as anyone else who 
was injured because Sloss failed to maintain his vehicle in 
proper mechanical condition. 
The controlling question, therefore, is whether Sloss was 
negligent and if so whether his negligence was a contributing 
cause of the accident. 
[7] Although a used car dealer does not insure the safety 
of a car he sells, and is under no duty to disassemble the car 
to examine its parts, he must make a reasonable inspection 
for defects that would make the car a menace on the highways. 
(Supera v. Moreland Sales Oorp., 13 Cal.App.2d 186, 191 
[56 P.2d 595] ; Egan Ohevrolet 00. v. Bruner, 102 F.2d 373, 
375; Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick 00., 196 Wis. 196, 210 [218 
N.W. 855, 60 A.L.R. 357]; see Prosser, Torts, p. 680; 122 
A.L.R. 997i 99 A.L.R. 240.) 
Section 660 of the Vehicle Code provides: "No dealer shall 
sell a used motor vehicle without first testing and if necessary 
adjusting the lights and brakes on such vehicle to conform 
with the provisions of this code." The standards for adequate 
brakes are set forth in section 670 of the Vehicle Code. Thus, 
a motor vehicle must be equipped with brakes adequate to 
bring it to a complete stop within 188 feet, when it is operated 
at a speed of 45 miles per hour on a dry asphalt or concrete 
pavement where the grade does not exceed 1 per cent. 
[8] Although Sloss testified that he had given the car a road 
test about five days before the proposed sale to Jay and 
that the brakes had then operated satisfactorily, there is no 
evidence that he made any test of the brakes to determine 
whether they met the standards prescribed by this section. 
Sloss' mechanics did not inspect or do any work on the brakes. 
The failure of the brakes shortly after delivery of the car 
to Jay indicates that the defect was present and discernible 
at the time of the proposed sale. Sloss' testimony at best 
) 
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created a conflict in the evidence, which the trial court re-
solved in plaintiffs' favor. The trial court could reasonably 
conclude that a reasonable inspection would have disclosed the 
defective bral,es. (Egan Chevrolet Co. v. Bruner, supra.) 
[9] We are also of the opinion that the trial court could 
reasonably conclude that Sloss' negligence was a contributing 
cause of plaintiffs' injuries. Jay's testimony, corroborated 
by the testimony of his guests and by the skid marks on the 
pavement, established that the right rear wheel of the car 
locked when Jay attempted to apply the brakes. At the most 
critica1 part of the operation, the brakes locked. Jay de-
scribed the situation: "Elden put on his brakes and I tried 
to get in between them [the two cars], and I hit my brakes 
and the back wheel locked and it [Jay's car] fish-tailed, and 
I didn't want to hit the fellow in front of me, and so I 
went clear over to hit the shoulder and cramped the wheels 
and it slid right into the pole." The shoulder had a gravel 
surface and once the car skidded off the pavement, Jay was 
unable to get it back on the highway. One of Jay's guests, 
Richard Kasitz, testified that the car swung to the right 
when Jay applied the brakes, although Jay kept turning the 
steering wheel to the left. 
Jay's negligent driving was unquestionably a cause of 
plaintiffs' injuries. Sloss' negligence was also a cause of 
those injuries, if it was a substantial factor in bringing 
them about. (McEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32 Ca1.2d 295, 
298 [195 P.2d 783] ; Rest., Torts, § 431.) This question of 
fact the trial court resolved in plaintiffs' favor. In the light 
of the evidence it could reasonably conclude that because of 
the defective brakes Jay could not avoid the collision. Since 
we canrrotsay that the issue is so clear that reasonable men 
cannot differ, the trial court '8' finding must be sustained. 
[10] The question remains whether the injury falls within 
the limits of Sloss' legal responsibility for the consequences 
of his conduct. Sloss could reasonably foresee that the brakes 
would be used in emergi'ncy conditions arising under ordinary 
highway speeds. (See Nebelung v. Norman, 14 Ca1.2d 647, 
652 [96 P.2d 327].) The negligent conduct of Jay did not 
relieve Sloss from liability, for the likelihood of negligent 
operation of the vehicle was one of the hazards that Sloss 
could reasonably foresee. (Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 
Cal.2d 213, 219, 220 [157 P.2d 372, 158 A.L.R. 872] ; McEvoy 
v. American Pool Corp., .~1tpra, 32 Ca1.2d 295, 298; Lacy v. 
Pacific Gas &. Elec. Co., 220 Cal. 97 [29 P.2d 7811 ; Opple v. 
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Ray, 208 Ind. 450, 456 [195 N.E. 81J ; see Rest., Torts, § 447.) 
[11] The possibility of a driver's negligently placing himself 
in a position from which he could not extricate himself without 
adequate brakes imposed on Sloss a duty to test and adjust 
the brakes of the car, and thus prevent it from endangering 
the lives of occupants, pedestrians, and other users of the 
highway. (Veh. Code, § 660; Fl·ies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 
supra; Fornlan v. Shields, 183 Wash. 333, 341 [48 P.2d 599].) 
Sloss' duty extended not only to the prospective buyer, 
but to third persons who could reasonably be expected to 
be in the vicinity of the probable use of the automobile. 
(Flies v. Fox Buick Co., supra (pedestrian); see Prosser, 
Torts, p. 680; Rest., Torts, §§ 388, 392.) The injury to Jay's 
guests was therefore within the limits of the risk created by 
Sloss' negligence. 
[12] Sloss contends that Jay was given permission only to 
take the automobile to his father's home to induce him to 
sign the contract. Therefore, he argues, the use of the car 
for a pleasure trip on the following day was without his 
implied or express permission. The evidence shows that Sloss 
allowed Jay to take the car home on Saturday afternoon 
about 5 o'clock, knowing that he was only 19 years old. Sloss 
could reasonably expect, and indeed anticipate with a sale 
in mind, that Jay would not only test the performance of 
the car but drive it for pleasure pending the negotiation of 
the contract. Sloss' own absence from the lot precluded Jay's 
returning the car. He closed his lot about 7 0 'clock Saturday 
night and went to a ball game, although Jay's father had 
telephoned earlier and asked Sloss to come for the car. The 
lot was likewise closed on Sunday morning. Under these 
circumstances, it cannot be said that Jay's operation of the 
car on Sunday was a risk beyond that created when Sloss 
allowed Jay to take the car from the lot on Saturday afternoon. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-I do not view the evidence as 
sufficient to sustain a finding that Sloss was guilty of negli-
gence proximately contributing to the accident; neither do 
I find the judgment against Sloss sustainable, upon the record, 
on any tenable theory of law. Accordingly, I should reverse 
the judgment. 
